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Defects, Due Process, and
Protective Proceedings
Should the requirements of due process
in protective proceedings be any lower
than those in criminal, juvenile, or civil
commitment cases? The authors argue
emphatically no.
By Susan G. Haines and
John J. Campbell
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we
do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede
their efforts to obtain it.... Mankind are greater gain-
ers by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest.'
!he purpose of protective proceedings is
to protect and assist those individuals
who lack the capacity to care for them-
selves or manage their property.2
' However, from the perspective of the
person to be protected, the appointment of a
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guardian or conservator can be both harsh and
humiliating. In a 1987 report, the House Special
Committee on Aging eloquently described the con-
sequences of appointment this way:
The typical ward has fewer rights than the typical con-
victed felon-[he] can no longer receive money or pay
[his] bills. . . .By appointing a guardian, the court
entrusts to someone else the power to choose where
[he] will live, what medical treatment [he] will get and,
in rare cases, when [he] will die. It is, in one short sen-
tence, the most punitive civil penalty that can be levied
against an American citizen ... '
Under the 14th Amendment, 4 the states may not
deprive any person of liberty or property without
due process of law. Since protective proceedings
will usually restrict an individual's liberty or access
to property, the protection sought must be applied
through due process of law. Unfortunately, the
application of due process to protective proceed-
ings is often nonexistent, insufficient, or ignored.
This article discusses due process considera-
tions' in light of the holding in Mathews v.
Eldridge,' then discusses considerations of proce-
dural due process in the context of adult guardian-
ship and conservatorship proceedings.
Does Constitutional Due Process Apply to
Guardianship and Conservatorship
Proceedings?
Analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge: Due Process
Considerations
When a state action, such as a conservator-
guardianship proceeding, impairs a constitutional-
ly protected liberty or property interest, the state
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must institute procedures to safeguard that inter-
est.7 The determination of whether a particular set
of procedures is constitutionally adequate is gov-
erned, in part, by the holding of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.8
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the original plaintiff,
Mr. Eldridge, had been receiving disability benefits
under the Social Security Act. Four years after his
benefits began, the Social Security Administration
unilaterally determined that he was no longer dis-
abled and discontinued his benefits without prior
notice and a hearing. The issue addressed by the
Court in Mathews was whether the Fifth
Amendment due process clause' ° requires that a
recipient of Social Security disability benefits be
afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing
before those benefits are terminated.11 Mr. Eldridge
argued that his entitlement to a hearing prior to
termination of benefits was mandated by the
Court's ruling in Goldberg v. Kelly. 2
Relying heavily on its earlier due process analy-
sis in Goldberg,'3 the Mathews Court set forth a
three-prong analysis to determine whether due
process required such an advance hearing. The
analysis involved (1) the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
(3) the government's interest, including the func-
tion involved and the fiscal and administrative bur-
dens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail. 4
In Goldberg, the plaintiff class asserted that the
14th Amendment due process clause required a full
hearing before the state of New York could termi-
nate their AFDC benefits.'" Prior to Goldberg, pro-
cedural due process analysis had progressed from
the simple proposition that due process required
only notice and an opportunity to defend.' 6 By the
time the Goldberg case came before the Court, due
process analysis had evolved to require the balanc-
ing of two factors: the individual liberty or proper-
ty interest involved and the governmental interest
involved.'7 The Court in Goldberg weighed the
individual interest in avoiding a wrongful loss of
AFDC benefits against two governmental interests
which actually were at cross purposes: the govern-
ment's interest in not wrongfully depriving eligible
AFDC recipients of their benefits; and the govern-
ment's interest in a speedy and summary adjudica-
tion."
The Goldberg Court, relying on Justice
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,9 then
expanded the traditional due process analysis by
holding that the extent of procedural due process
protection required was also influenced by the
extent to which the individual might be "con-
demned to suffer grievous loss."20 The Court gave
great weight to the fact that the plaintiffs had been
receiving benefits based solely on financial need,
such that "termination of aid pending resolution of
a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligi-
ble recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits."2 The Court held that, in the case
of these financial needs-based benefits, a pretermi-
nation hearing was required by the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment.
By the time the Court decided Goldberg, the old
two-factor balancing test was under severe criti-
cism, as exemplified by Justice Black's dissent in
that case.22 In practice, as Justice Black pointed out,
the determination of applicable due process stan-
dards had come to depend almost exclusively on
the importance of the individual interest involved.23
Hence, the Court's subtle expansion of the tradi-
tional due process analysis in Goldberg was not
only an attempt to assuage some of that criticism,
but also the springboard for the next step in the
evolution of due process analysis.
The three-factor analysis defined in Mathews
was not a new approach to due process analysis at
all. Rather, it was a recognition of the manner in
which the old two-factor analysis had evolved and
had actually come to be applied through Goldberg:
that is, balancing individual liberty or property
interests against the government's interests in exer-
cising its powers and in preserving fiscal resources
and, in addition, considering the risk of "grievous
loss" to the individual.24 The Mathews Court
acknowledged the expanded analysis actually used
in the Goldberg case and restated the parameters of
due process analysis in recognition of this reality.
The year after Mathews, the Court specifically
relied on the Mathews test in determining a 14th
Amendment due process challenge directed at
administrative procedures in the state of New York
regarding the relocating of foster children, thus
officially making Mathews applicable to 14th
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Amendment cases.2" In 1979 the Mathews test was
given broad 14th Amendment applicability in the
case of Parham v. J.R.,26 which involved a challenge
to Georgia's proceedings for institutionalizing dis-
turbed children.27 Four years later, in Hewit v.
Helms, 28 the Court held that "[u]nder Mathews v.
Eldridge, we consider the private interests at stake
in a government decision, the governmental inter-
ests involved, and the value of procedural require-
ments in determining what process is due under the
14th Amendment. 29
The three-prong analysis stated in Mathews,
created originally to address 5th Amendment due
process questions in the context of administrative
procedures," has since come to be recognized by
the Court as the applicable analysis in all cases in
which state procedures are challenged on due
process grounds under both the 5th and 14th
Amendments. 31
Application of Mathews v. Eldridge to Due
Process Analysis in Guardianship and
Conservatorship Proceedings
The Court in Mathews3 2 observed that procedural
due process must be accorded to any government
action that deprives individuals of "liberty" or
"property" interests within the meaning of the due
process clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.33
Individual Interest
The first part of the Mathews balancing test
requires that the individual liberty or property inter-
ests in question be identified and evaluated. In gen-
eral, guardianships and conservatorships place a
third party in control of the ward's person and
property, respectively. That third party is then able
to make decisions for the ward without the ward's
input. The constitutionally protected individual
interests implicated in a guardianship proceeding
include the right to choose where to live and with
whom to associate, the right to make medical deci-
sions regarding one's body, the right to marry and
to freely associate, the right to travel or pursue in
privacy the activities of daily living, and the right to
be free from unwanted constraints or incarceration.
Generally, a guardian has the same powers,
rights, and duties respecting his or her ward that a
parent has respecting an unemancipated minor
child, except that the guardian is not required to
provide for the ward and is generally not liable to
third persons for acts of the ward.34 The guardian
also may be empowered to give any consent or
approval that may be necessary for the ward to
obtain medical treatment or other professional
care, counseling, or services, 3 including the place-
ment of the ward in a locked environment. Thus,
the appointment of a guardian can result in the
deprivation of significant liberty interests, at least
some of which may be fundamental in nature.36
In a protective proceeding involving a conserva-
tor, the protected person may be deprived of the
general right to own and use property (as distin-
guished from a specific property interest). 3r This
right has been held to constitute "an essential pre-
condition to the realization of other basic civil
rights and liberties .. .-3' and "no less than the
right to speak or the right to travel, [it] is in truth
a 'personal right. ' ' 39 The individual interests impli-
cated in both guardianships and conservatorships
would intuitively appear to be of the most funda-
mental importance, thereby justifying the applica-
tion of the broadest due process procedures.
The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Individual
Interest
The first and second prongs of the Mathews test
focus on the individual's interest that is affected by
the government's action. The second prong, in par-
ticular, examines the "risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value of additional proce-
dural safeguards."" ° When considering this factor,
the court should examine the extent to which the
procedure in question may reduce the risk that the
individual will be erroneously deprived of funda-
mental liberties.41
It is not the deprivation of a liberty interest that
is subject to due process scrutiny. Rather, it is the
erroneous deprivation of that liberty interest that
must be protected with due process. The risk of
erroneous deprivation of an individual interest can
be minimal, as in San Diego Department of Social
Services v. Moore,42 where the state provided the
ward with numerous opportunities to challenge the
conservatorship and also the reestablishment of the
conservatorship. However, in instances where a
conservatorship or guardianship is issued ex parte,
as in the case of In re Evatt,43 and the ward does
not have an opportunity to be present at a hearing
or meaningfully object to the protective proceed-
ing, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty is
high.
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The State's Interest
The third prong of the Mathews analysis involves
identifying the government's interest that the state
procedure in question is to further and balancing
that interest against the individual interests. That
is, if the state procedure is allowed to stand, what
governmental interest will be preserved? And final-
ly, if the governmental interest is important, but the
risk of erroneous deprivation to the individual is
high, what will be the fiscal and administrative
costs to the state in changing its procedures? In the
context of protective proceedings, the state's inter-
est is most often in protecting the well-being of
those individual citizens who are not able to care
for themselves, where the sole criterion for the state
is the "best interests" of the individual. This inter-
est is commonly expressed as the state's parens
patriae power and is the driving force behind pro-
tective proceedings."
The United States Supreme Court, in Parham v.
J.R.,45 recognized that there may be instances where
the costs of additional procedures, including fiscal,
administrative, and intangible costs, outweigh a
significant intrusion on personal liberty. At issue in
Parham v. J.R.46 was the constitutionality of
Georgia's procedures for admitting a child for
treatment to a state mental hospital. Under
Georgia's statute at the time, the following proce-
dures were required to voluntarily admit a child to
a state mental hospital: (1) A parent or guardian of
the child must sign an application for hospitaliza-
tion; (2) the superintendent of the hospital could
temporarily admit the child for observation and
diagnosis; and (3) upon a finding by the superin-
tendent that there is evidence of mental illness and
that the child is suitable for treatment, the child
could be admitted. 7 The statute also provided that
any patient who had been hospitalized for more
than five days could be discharged upon the request
of a parent or guardian. In the absence of such a
request, the hospital had the affirmative duty to
discharge any patient who has recovered or suffi-
ciently improved so as not to need hospitalization
as determined by the superintendent.48
Georgia's scheme was challenged in a class
action suit by patients of the state mental hospitals
on the basis that Georgia's statute violated due
process because the children were never given a
hearing prior to or subsequent to hospitalization.
The Federal District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia held that the Georgia statute was
unconstitutional and that, at a minimum, due
process required that the child receive notice and
an adversarial-type hearing before an impartial
tribunal.
The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the district
court's decision and found that Georgia's proce-
dures for admitting children to mental hospitals
provided adequate due process. In reaching its
decision, the Court balanced the impact of an
adversarial hearing on the family unit, as well as
the cost of overhauling Georgia's statutory scheme,
against the risk that a child will be erroneously
placed in the institution. The Court concluded that
the "cost" of implementing an adversarial-type
hearing, including both monetary costs and intan-
gible costs to the family unit, outweighed the risks
that a child would be erroneously institutionalized.
Applying the Mathews Test
Courts in various states have used the Mathews test
to determine the constitutionality of statutes relat-
ing to wards or protected people as well as the con-
stitutionality of statutes authorizing conservator-
ships and guardianships. In the case of In re
Branning," the Illinois Court of Appeals had to
decide the constitutionality of a state statute that
authorized a guardian to consent to electroconvul-
sive therapy (ECT) for an elderly ward with only
court approval. In applying the Mathews test, the
court found that the ward's liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted ECT was significant because the
therapy was invasive and had significant side
effects."0 The risk of erroneous deprivation of the
ward's liberty was substantial because the statute's
only procedural requirements were that (1) the
guardian's consent to the therapy must be
informed, (2) the guardian must believe the treat-
ment is in the ward's best interests, and (3) a court
approve the guardian's consent.5' There were no
requirements that the court receive input from any
healthcare professional, or even require proof that
the ward was incapable of making rational choices
for himself. When compared against the state's
parens patriae interest,5 2 the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the ward's liberty outweighed the
fiscal and administrative burdens that additional
procedural safeguards would provide. 3
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in In re Evatt'
used the Mathews test to determine whether that
state's temporary guardianship statute was uncon-
stitutional. In that case, an Arkansas probate court,
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acting pursuant to a statutory provision, signed a
90-day ex parte order of temporary guardianship
of the person without any notice to the proposed
ward.55 After the hearing, at which the ward was
not present, the sheriff picked up the ward and
detained him in the local jail. Arkansas' statute
authorizing temporary guardianships did not
require, or even authorize, an immediate hearing
following the entry of the initial order, and so none
was held. On appeal, the ward argued that the
temporary guardianship statute denied him proce-
dural due process because the statute authorizes
temporary guardianships without notice and did
not authorize a hearing after the guardianship was
granted."' Applying the Mathews test, the court
found that the private interests affected by the offi-
cial action in a temporary guardianship of the per-
son and of the estate are the rights to control the
ward's person and property, respectively, for up to
90 days. The court stated that "[i]n essence, the
interests affected are the freedom and property of
the ward. To place a guardian in control of these
interests is to deprive a ward of basic rights ...
[T]he interests affected are sufficient to require pro-
cedural due process.""7
The Evatt court concluded that by not provid-
ing the prospective ward with notice of the pro-
posed protective proceeding and an opportunity to
be present at a hearing and to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, Arkansas' temporary conserva-
tor statutes substantially increased the risk that the
individual could be erroneously deprived of funda-
mental liberties. In balancing the Mathews factors,
the court noted that the state's interest in exercising
its benevolent parens patriae power to protect inca-
pacitated persons from injuring themselves or oth-
ers is compelling. In fact, the court noted that there
might be situations where advance notice could
defeat the statute's purposes; that is, the incapaci-
tated person might flee or harm himself or herself
or others before the hearing could be held.
Therefore, the court held that advance notice of the
ex parte hearing is not necessary to comply with
due process because the state's parens patriae out-
weighed the individual liberty interest. However,
the court found that the risk of someone being
detained for up to 90 days without a hearing was
substantial, and there were no procedural safe-
guards to prevent such an occurrence."8 Procedural
safeguards, designed to prevent the wrongful incar-
ceration of an individual, 9 were administratively
feasible and did not outweigh the substantial risk
that someone might be wrongfully deprived of his
or her liberty.
State procedures were similarly examined by
the California Court of Appeals, but with different
results. In San Diego Department of Social Services
v. Moore,"0 the California Court of Appeals was
asked to decide whether that state's statute allow-
ing a conservator to reestablish a mental health
conservatorship, after the expiration of the initial
conservatorship period,6 ' through ex parte proce-
dures was unconstitutional.62 The court reasoned
that while the reestablishment of a conservatorship
intruded upon the ward's liberty interests, the
statute provided for meaningful notice to the ward
and an opportunity to oppose the new conserva-
torship. The court also found that the risk of erro-
neous deprivation was significantly reduced by the
fact that the statute allowed the ward to directly
and immediately challenge the ex parte reestablish-
ment. 3 Unlike Arkansas, the California court
found that California's procedures reduced the risk
of erroneous intrusion on the ward's liberty.64
In State ex rel. McCormick v. Burson,"5 the peti-
tioner, Mr. McCormick, challenged the constitu-
tionality of Tennessee's conservatorship statute on
the basis that the statute did not provide for auto-
matic review of the ward's incompetency after the
establishment of the conservatorship. The statute
at issue contained extensive procedural require-
ments prior to the appointment of a conservator,
such as the right to a jury trial, the right to be pre-
sent at all hearings and present evidence, and the
right to an attorney. 6 In addition, the statute pro-
vided that (1) the court could discharge the conser-
vator if it found that the ward was no longer dis-
abled; (2) the ward or anyone acting on his or her
behalf can petition the court at anytime for disso-
lution of the conservatorship; (3) the petition can
be made by any means, including oral communica-
tion or an informal letter; and (4) upon receipt of
the petition, the court is required to hold a hearing
in which the ward has all of the rights that he or
she had in the initial competency hearing. 7
Mr. McCormick did not challenge these state
procedures for establishing the conservatorship.
Rather, he contended that the statute did not pro-
vide a method for determining whether the ward
remained incompetent after establishment of the
conservatorship and that the state should have to
prove that the ward is, and will remain, incompe-
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tent in the future.6 1 In particular, the petitioner con-
tended that the statute should require that (1)
annual physician affidavits be filed with the con-
servator's affidavit; (2) the state to give notice to
each ward of his or her right to have a hearing to
dissolve the conservatorship; (3) a ward have
unlimited access to his or her medical records; and
(4) the conservator bears the burden of proving
in subsequent hearings that the ward remains
incapacitated.
In examining McCormick's challenge, the
court found that "[alt some point, the benefit of
an additional safeguard to the individual . . . and
to society ... may be outweighed by the cost."69
The procedures requested by the petitioner were
not justified, the court found, in light of the ease
with which any ward could request a meaningful
hearing at any time. In balancing the interests of
both the state and the individual, the court stated
that Tennessee's "simple procedure for contesting
incompetency, especially in light of the interest in
containing costs to the estate of wards and itself,
affords adequate due process. '' 7 The McCormick
court reasoned that the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of the ward's freedom was minimal because
simple procedures were already available to the
ward to request a hearing to reevaluate his or her
competency. Therefore, those risks were out-
weighed by the monetary and administrative costs
of additional procedures.
Courts May Not Impose "Protection" of
Guardianship or Conservatorship Without
Protecting Due Process Rights
The West Virginia Supreme Court, in State ex rel.
Shamblin v. Collier7' eloquently explained the rela-
tionship between protective proceedings and con-
stitutionally protected liberty interests this way:
It is axiomatic that a declaration of incompetency and
the resulting appointment of a committee, guardian,
or conservator to oversee an individual's affairs may
affect constitutionally guaranteed liberty interests:
One of the historic liberties which is protected by the
due process clauses ... is the right to be free from, and
to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on
personal security. Appointment of a guardian results
in a massive curtailment of liberty, and it may also
engender adverse social consequences. The guardian
becomes the custodian of the person, estate and busi-
ness affairs of the ward; the guardian dictates the
ward's residence; the ward's freedom to travel is cur-
tailed; and the ward's legal relationship with others is
limited.72
The appointment of a guardian or a conserva-
tor will always involve the deprivation of liberty or
property interests to some degree. Therefore,
Mathews v. Eldridge73 would seem to require that
some due process protections are necessary in every
guardianship and conservatorship proceeding.
Both the Tennessee and Arkansas supreme courts
have recognized that the three-pronged analysis set
forth in Mathews must be applied to determine
what procedural due process is required constitu-
tionally in guardianship and conservatorship
cases.74 The Tennessee Supreme Court, determining
the constitutionality of Tennessee's conservatorship
statute in State ex rel. McCormick v. Burson,75 stat-
ed that "[iun Mathews, . . . the United States
Supreme Court outlined the factors to consider
when analyzing a case such as this. ' 76 Thus,
Mathews and its progeny, at both the state and fed-
era 7 levels, would seem to require that the three-
part analysis in Mathews be used to determine
whether a particular set of procedures is constitu-
tionally adequate in guardianship and conservator-
ship proceedings.
What Procedures Are Necessary to
Adequately Protect Due Process Rights?
Assuming that an analysis of the three-prong test in
Mathews v. Eldridge yields the conclusion that the
doctrine of due process must be applied in protec-
tive proceedings, the question remains: What
process is due? Depending upon the importance of
the individual interest or interests at stake, the
degree of due process required could range from
the minimum of notice and a right to be heard 8 to
the full panoply of due process rights afforded to
criminal defendants.79
The most fundamental of liberties are at stake
for the individual ward or protected person in a
protective proceeding. At stake for the government
in this proceeding is its parens patriae power. The
risk for wrongful deprivation of individual rights
through use of that governmental power is enor-
mous. What remains is to determine the particular
due process protections necessary in guardianships
and protective proceedings.
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Civil Commitment Proceedings
In In re Gault,"° the U.S. Supreme Court first held
that the rights to counsel, to confrontation, to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses, to freedom
from compulsory self-incrimination, and to exclu-
sion of hearsay evidence, all required by the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment in the crim-
inal context, must also be applied in the context of
juvenile court proceedings, where delinquency mat-
ters are determined.81 In so holding, the Court
looked beyond the semantic differences between
"criminal" and "civil" proceedings and focused on
the fundamental liberties that are at stake in both
proceedings. The Court added other 14th
Amendment due process protections to juvenile
proceedings in succeeding cases.82
The opinion in Gault83 opened the door for
application of stricter due process protections in
other civil cases. In Heryford v. Parker,4 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found the
Gault case controlling when it held that defendants
in civil commitment proceedings were entitled to be
represented by counsel." The court went even fur-
ther in dicta, stating that all 14th Amendment due
process protections should also be required in civil
commitment cases.86 In so holding, the 10th Circuit
stated:
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled
"civil" or "criminal" or whether the subject matter be
mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It is the like-
lihood of involuntary incarceration-whether for pun-
ishment as an adult for a crime, rehabilitation as a
juvenile for delinquency, or treatment and training as
a feeble-minded or mental incompetent-which com-
mands observance of the constitutional safeguards of
due process."
In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Humphrey v. Cady88 that the availability of a jury
trial in civil commitment cases was required by due
process and recognized the "massive curtailment of
liberty" at stake in civil commitment proceedings.8 9
That same year, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin required that civil
commitment defendants be afforded the right to
counsel, the right to freedom from compulsory self-
incrimination, the right to meaningful advance
notice and full evidentiary hearing, the right to
exclusion of hearsay evidence, and the right to
require the government to prove all of the elements
of its case beyond a reasonable doubt." The
Lessard court further required strict standards as to
what constitutes "incompetency," based on the
issues of "vagueness" and "overbreadth" con-
tained in the concept of substantive due process. 1
Following the Supreme Court in Humphrey v.
Cady, at least one state supreme court has held that
all procedures required in criminal proceedings
must be afforded in civil commitment cases as
well. 2
In People v. Lane 3 the Court recognized the
holding in the Humphrey case and noted the
importance of the constitutional right at stake
when making a determination for long-term com-
mitment for a minor. The Court stated that it must
"carefully scrutinize" 94 the proof in every case, and
held that "hearings before the court . . . shall be
conducted in the same manner as other civil pro-
ceedings." 5
Protective Proceedings
The rationale behind applying due process so vig-
orously in civil commitment cases is applicable to
protective proceeding cases, as the same fundamen-
tal liberties are involved 96 and the state interest in
protective proceedings is even less compelling. The
interest is less compelling because civil commit-
ment proceedings deal with society's interest in
protecting itself from dangerous individuals, 97
while in protective proceedings, rarely is the person
to be protected a danger to anyone but himself. 8
For instance, the Lessard opinion continually refers
to the parens patriae power by name, yet the
court's holding suggests that it is really talking
about the police power.99 The result is that judicial
scrutiny of the exercise of the parens patriae power
has been imprecise, and the state's parens patriae
power in guardianship and conservatorship pro-
ceedings has historically been exercised with little
or no concern for due process protections.100
However, the parens patriae power, whose purpose
is to protect the incompetent individual's best inter-
ests, constitutes a much less "important" power
from the government's perspective than does the
police power, whose purpose is to protect society at
large, as well as the individual, from actual danger.
The duty to monitor and maintain state health rests
with the state governments and their respective
agents.' The "police power" granted to each state
is not formally given, accepted, or outlined in any
particular state or federal constitution. It is not a
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rule of law.102 In fact, the source of the power stems
from the nature of our institutions and their oblig-
ation to protect their citizens.0 3
The exact meaning of the term has been the
cause of much debate. Because of its great scope
and evolving nature, it is difficult for authorities to
agree on one specific definition.'" However, despite
the lack of consensus as to the term's precise defin-
ition, many authorities seem to describe the gist of
the term in a manner similar to the following:
This police power of the State ... extends to the pro-
tection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons .... And again [by this] general police
power of the State, persons and property are subject-
ed to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of
the state."' 5
Finally, there is as great a risk in protective pro-
ceedings, if not greater, that less than the strictest
procedures could result in wrongful deprivations of
liberty and property. This is so because protective
proceedings often result in "permanent orders"
that endure for years, while civil commitment pro-
ceedings are often for "short-term" treatment.
Further, protective orders often result in the com-
plete loss of freedom for the ward and the complete
deprivation of the ward's property.
Under the circumstances present in a protective
proceeding, the authors postulate that the very
highest due process protections must be required.
As Judge Sprecher stated on behalf of the court in
his opinion in Lessard, "The importance of the
interests involved in this situation are the highest,
in that the deprivation of liberty necessarily is one
based on status and not on the alleged commission
of an act deemed criminal by society."106
Often, the ward is not completely incapacitated,
nor has his condition led him to engage in criminal
behavior. Despite this, the incapacitated person is
afforded less stringent procedural protection than
that afforded to the criminal defendant or the men-
tally ill. It is unclear which compelling state inter-
est would justify the involuntary restriction of the
innocent but feeble-minded with less due process
than the mentally ill and/or the criminally minded.
There is no cogent reason why the due process
standard in protective proceedings should be any
lower than those applicable in juvenile, criminal, or
civil commitment cases. From a constitutional per-
spective, the minimum requirement of due process
in guardianships and protective proceedings
requires every protection afforded to a criminal
defendant or the mentally ill. Those protections are
(1) proper notice and hearing;0 7 (2) the opportu-
nity to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses; °8 (3) a mandated standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt or clear and convincing evi-
dence;0 9 (4) appointment of counsel;"0 (5) freedom
from compulsory self-incrimination;"' (6) the right
to be present at any hearing;" 2 (7) the right to
exclusion of hearsay and other unreliable evi-
dence;"3 (8) the right to a jury trial;"' and (9) the
right, on appeal, to a transcript of the record at the
state's expense, if indigent."5
Conclusion
There may be instances in law where our intuitive,
ethical sense about due process considerations
should be suspended. For example, we suspend due
process in the mental health arena when individu-
als are in danger of harming themselves or another.
We apprehend the individual, halting the danger
first, then concern ourselves with the autonomy of
the individual and due process considerations.
Protective proceedings are an example of
instances in the law when not only is due process
suspended occasionally, but our intuitive, ethical
sense tells us that in these instances due process
should, on occasion, be suspended. When an indi-
vidual's incapacity is such that, given the time for
notice and a hearing, the individual will be griev-
ously injured or his or her property will be dissi-
pated, it seems proper that due process should then
be temporarily suspended. However, absent such a
dire emergency, all precautions must be taken to
preserve and protect the individual's constitutional
rights.
The abuses of due process have been, and con-
tinue to be, harsh and devastating to those whose
rights are violated. Only broad, comprehensive
statutory reforms, aimed at striking the delicate bal-
ance between the rights of individual liberty and the
needs of those unable to exercise those rights due to
disability or incapacity, can remedy the abuses.
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